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Non-technical Summary 
 
Most economic models predict a positive relation between market concentration and profit-
ability. However, in empirical research, this positive link is frequently either only weak, or 
cannot be estimated, or the relation even turns out to be negative. Schmalensee (1989) con-
cludes: “The relation, if any, between seller concentration and profitability is weak statisti-
cally, and the estimated concentration effect is usually small. The estimated relation is unsta-
ble over time and space and vanishes in many multivariate studies.”  
In this study, we use alternative measures of market structure. First, we use conventional in-
dustry-based concentration indices, like the Herfindahl index, C3 and C6 concentration. Sec-
ond, we further include firm-level questionnaire data about the perceived market environment. 
The latter includes the number of competitors in a firm’s main market, the average size of the 
competitors, the intensity of price competition and buyer power.  
The results based on the industry classification show no effect on profitability. However, sur-
vey information concerning the competitive environment works extremely well in explaining 
profitability. Apparently, the firms themselves assess the competitive environment much more 
accurately than the conventional and broadly-used concentration measures based on industry 
classification. Unlike the firms’ assessment, the aggregate variables are not able to identify 
the relevant market of the companies. 
   
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
 
Die meisten ökonomischen Modelle finden einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Markt-
konzentration und Profitabilität. In der empirischen Forschung ist dieser positive Zusammen-
hang oft schwach, gar nicht vorhanden oder sogar negativ. Schmalensee (1989) fasst zusam-
men: „The relation, if any, between seller concentration and profitability is weak statistically, 
and the estimated concentration effect is usually small. The estimated relation is unstable over 
time and space and vanishes in many multivariate studies.“ 
In dieser Studie verwenden wir verschiedene Maße für die Marktstruktur. Zunächst benutzen 
wir konventionelle Konzentrationindizes auf Branchenebene, wie den Herfindahl-Index, C3- 
und C6-Konzentration. In einem zweiten Schritt ziehen wir darüber hinaus auch Daten aus 
Unternehmensbefragungen hinzu, die die Marktumgebung, wie sie von den Unternehmen 
wahrgenommen wird, abbildet. Wir sind somit in der Lage Angaben zur Anzahl der Konkur-
renten auf dem Hauptabsatzmarkt, der durchschnittlichen Größe der Konkurrenten, der Inten-
sität des Preiswettbewerbs und der Kundenmacht mit in die Analyse einzubeziehen.  
Die Ergebnisse, die auf der Branchenklassifizierung beruhen, zeigen keinen Effekt auf die 
Profitabilität von Unternehmen. Somit findet sich Schmalensees Beobachtung in unseren Da-
ten wieder. Ziehen wir Informationen aus den Befragungen hinzu, finden wir die erwarteten 
Effekte bzgl. des Zusammenhangs zwischen Wettbewerbsumfeld und Profitabilität. Offen-
sichtlich beurteilen die Unternehmen ihr Wettbewerbsumfeld besser als aggregierte, konven-
tionelle und weit verbreitete Konzentrationsmaße, die sich auf Branchenklassifikationen stüt-
zen. Wir interpretieren dieses Ergebnis so, dass über die aggregierten Maße der relevante 
Markt nicht adäquat abgebildet werden kann, wohingegen Unternehmensbefragungen in der 
Lage sind, genau diesen relevanten Markt besser darzustellen. 
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Abstract 
Theory predicts a positive relationship between market concentration 
and profitability in most scenarios. In empirical work, however, this 
relation is frequently not found or only a weak connection is observed. 
We compare the performance of concentration and market share vari-
ables, which are generated on the basis of the official industry classifi-
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Hence, the poor quality of industry data is responsible for the loose 
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1 Introduction 
Most economic models predict a positive relation between market concentration and profit-
ability. However, in empirical research, this positive link is frequently either only weak, or 
cannot be estimated, or the relation even turns out to be negative. Schmalensee (1989) con-
cludes: “The relation, if any, between seller concentration and profitability is weak statisti-
cally, and the estimated concentration effect is usually small. The estimated relation is unsta-
ble over time and space and vanishes in many multivariate studies.”  
Recent IO literature has abandoned the empirical approach to link profitability to market con-
centration. Slade (2004) discusses the shortcomings in detail. One reason is the inability of 
empiricists to determine causality instead of a correlation. Particularly in cross section analy-
ses, endogeneity problems arise when relating concentration measures to profitability. An-
other critic is that industry classifications, which are assumed to be the best approximation for 
the “market”, are based on a too broad definition. Consequently, industries may pool “sub-
markets” with very different structures. Furthermore, firms are assigned to one industry, their 
perceived “main industry”, but may operate in several different industries. The basic structure 
conduct performance paradigm has also been criticized because it is supposedly not derived 
from models with optimizing agents. However, in her own empirical study Slade (2004) finds 
strong support for the old fashioned SCP paradigm. 
In this study, we use alternative measures of market structure and scrutinize the appropriate-
ness of standard industry-based concentration indices estimating profitability equations for a 
number of German manufacturing firms. We use conventional industry-based concentration 
indices, the individual market share - relating firm sales to industry sales - and, in addition, 
firm-level questionnaire data about the perceived market environment. The latter includes the 
number of competitors in a firm’s main market, the average size of the competitors, the inten-
sity of price competition and buyer power. The variables describing the competitive situation 
are used along with other variables to explain profitability. The results based on the industry 
classification display no effect on profitability. However, direct information concerning the 
competitive environment works extremely well in explaining profitability. Apparently, the 
firms themselves assess the competitive environment much more accurately than the conven-
tional and broadly-used concentration measures based on industry classification. Unlike the 
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firms’ assessment, the aggregate variables are not able to identify the relevant market of the 
companies. 
 
2 General Considerations and Research Strategy 
Most oligopoly models like Cournot or Bertrand predict a negative relation between the num-
ber of firms active in an industry and profitability, for homogenous and heterogeneous prod-
ucts. If firms active in an industry form a cartel, this hypothesis does not hold, since monop-
oly profits are generated although the number of firms exceeds one. But, in such a setting, 
incentives exist to secretly break the agreement or to form an independent fringe1. These in-
centives become more relevant with an increasing number of colluding firms. Consequently, 
even in industries with cartels, a negative relation between profitability and the number of 
firms probably exists.  
In contrast to this view, it is also hypothesized that the positive association between profitabil-
ity and concentration is due to efficiency advantages of large firms. If a firm is more efficient 
than others, it will be able to reduce prices and will gain market share at the expense of the 
less efficient producers. As a result, concentration indices should be positively correlated with 
profitability of the larger firms, but not because of collusion. 
The predictions from theory have been tested in numerous studies. Usually, concentration 
measures constructed on a more or less disaggregated industry-level are applied to explain 
profitability measures. In order to check for possible efficiency differences, the individual 
market shares are also included. However, the results are mixed. In any case, the empirical 
relations found between concentration indices and profitability are not very robust.  
For our comparison between industry-based and survey-based data we use firm level informa-
tion from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). Data collection is carried out by the Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research. The MIP has provided annual information on innovative behaviour in the German 
 
1 Selten (1973), d’Aspremont, Jaquemin, Jaskold-Gabszewicz and Weymark (1983), Martin (2002) chapter 10.  
manufacturing sector since 1992. The MIP is also the German contribution to the CIS, the 
European Community Innovation Survey.  
The dependent variable is the profit margin. This variable is sometimes called excess return 
on sales and expresses the following: 
 - labor cost - capitalcost - materialcost=i i
i i
s
s s
π  
with iπ denoting profits and s  being firm (not industry) sales. If firms are in long-run equilib-
rium and are operating in the range of their production functions with constant returns to 
scale, the excess profit return on sales will, on average across all products of the firm, equal 
the Lerner index. With constant returns to scale, marginal cost (MC) is equal to average cost 
(AC). One can therefore write: 
i
 i
i
pq ACq p MC
s pq p
π − −= =  
with p being the price and q the quantity produced. Hence, our measure of profitability is the 
price-cost margin, where the capital costs have been subtracted and need not be taken into 
account as an explanatory variable (e.g. capital divided by sales) as in other empirical models 
considering the price-cost margin2. 
 Profitability is measured by the categorical variable return on sales, which was included in 
the MIP surveys of the years 2003 and 2005. The respective categories are depicted in Table 
1. The information is available for the years 2001 to 2004 because in both surveys firms were 
asked to state the return on sales for both years preceding the survey year. 
Table 1: Surveyed categories of the return on sales 
Return on sales Class   Return on sales Class  Return on sales Class  
< 0 % 0  (4 – 7%] 3  > 15% 6 
(0 – 2%] 1  (7-10%] 4  don't know 7 
(2 – 4%] 2  (10 – 15%] 5    
                                                 
2 The usual way to estimate price-cost margins was introduced by Collins and Preston (1969). There are numer-
ous studies that follow the same methodology. 
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As can be seen in the descriptive statistics depicted in Table 2 the average firm generates be-
tween 2 and 7 % return on sales as the mean is 2.4 and represents the average category.  
In this paper we compare the performance of different measures reflecting the competitive 
environment of firms. To do this, we use different data sources: first, publicly available, con-
ventional measures of market concentration, and second, variables from the questionnaire-
based survey displaying firms’ assessment of their competitive situation. We suppose that in 
general a firm’s own evaluation of the competitive situation is more accurate than conven-
tional industry-level concentration indices. This is because the industry-level data based on 
NACE codes may not exactly capture the relevant market, whereas in survey data the firms 
answer for their perceived market environment.   
The publicly available variables are C3 and C6 concentration indices3, a Herfindahl concen-
tration index and industry sales. We use the latter to construct the firms’ market shares by 
relating the individual sales to industry sales. These industry-level competition variables are 
gathered using information published in the biennial reports of the German Monopolies Com-
mission, which provides the relevant information at the three-digit NACE level. It is possible 
that more disaggregated data would be more suited to describe the relevant market. However, 
quite a number of studies which investigate the effects of market structure rely on three digit 
industry data, so a comparison with our survey-based variables seems to be appropriate and 
meaningful.   
Our approach is to use information about the competitive situation reported by the firms sur-
veyed in the MIP. Firms were asked to evaluate how many main competitors they have. The 
options proposed for their assessments were “none”, “1 to 5”, “6 to 15” and “more than 15”. 
We compute a dummy variable called intermediate competition, which has unit value, if the 
firm chooses the option “6 to 15” and secondly a dummy variable called intensive competition 
if the firm chooses the option “more than 15”. Over 13 % of the firms are exposed to intensive 
competition, in that they face more than 15 competitors. Almost a third of the firms experi-
ence intermediate competition, competing with 6 to 15 firms. Next, we take into account the 
 
3 The C3 (C6) concentration index indicates the fraction of industry sales generated by the three (six) largest 
firms. 
size structure of the competitors. We use a dummy variable called competitors size, which has 
unit value, if a firm expresses that the competitors are predominantly larger than itself. This is 
the case for more than 35 % of the firms. We also have information on the importance of 
price competition. Firms were asked to rank the importance of several characteristics of their 
competitive environment (product quality, technical advancement, service, product variety, 
advertising and price). We create a dummy variable with unit value if the option “price” was 
given highest priority. Almost half of the firms are exposed to strong price competition. 
Aside from supplier conditions, profitability may also be affected by buyer power. If a firm 
only sells to a few buyers, it is possible that these buyers exert so-called buyer power, which 
leads to price cuts. The concentration of buyer power is considered in the questionnaire by 
means of a question asking what share of the firm’s sales is due to the three most important 
buyers. The possible answers were “100%”, “50-99%”, “20-49%” and “below 20%”. We use 
the dummy variables strong buyer power when the alternative “100%” is chosen, quite strong 
buyer power if the buyer concentration ranges between 50 and 99%. 1.7 % of the firms re-
ported that all sales were generated by their three most important customers (strong buyer 
power). More than a quarter generated over 50 % of sales from their three most important 
buyers (quite strong buyer power). The competition and buyer power variables were only 
included in the 2005 questionnaire and represent the competitive situation in 2004. We con-
jecture that neither competition nor buyer power changes much in the short-run. Therefore, 
we hold these variables constant over time for the observation period of 2001 to 2004. 
Another important factor that impacts on profitability and is also linked to consumers is the 
market potential. Market potential is often reflected by the lagged market demand growth, 
proxied by the growth of sales at the three-digit industry level. This is calculated as follows: 
 , 1
, 1
 st s tst
s t
S S
market demand
S
−
−
−=  
where the market demand in sector s at time t depends on the change in sales (S). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RETURN ON SALES 2.3514 1.7231 0 6 
HERFINDAHL* 0.0313 0.0420 0.0032 0.2507 
C3 CONCENTRATION* 0.1915 0.1370 0.0578 0.8452 
C6 CONCENTRATION* 0.2709 0.1664 0.0838 0.9534 
SHARE* 0.0051 0.0152 0 0.1640 
INTENSIVE COMPETITION 0.1313 0.3378 0 1 
INTERMEDIATE 
COMPETITION 0.2400 0.4272 0 1 
COMPETITORS SIZE 0.3551 0.4786 0 1 
STONG PRICE COMPETITION 0.4867 0.4999 0 1 
STRONG BUYER POWER 0.0170 0.1291 0 1 
QUITE STRONG BUYER 
POWER 0.2566 0.4369 0 1 
DEMAND GROWTH* 0.0003 0.0744 -0.6243 0.3389 
SHARE* 0.0051 0.0152 0 0.1640 
EXPORT 0.2386 0.2521 0 0.9190 
IMPORT 0.2499 0.1345 0.0598 0.7116 
KAPINT 0.0977 0.1529 0.0004 1.9558 
Log(EMPLOYEES) 4.3887 1.5368 1.6094 10.8808 
EAST 0.3408 0.4740 0 1 
* Lagged values. 
More conventional control variables are the share of sales exported, industry imports divided 
by the sum of industry imports and industry production (import) and the capital intensity 
kapint (fixed and working capital/number of employees). Clearly, all three variables are also 
used to represent the competitive environment of a firm and the industry. Information on ex-
ports and capital intensity is taken from the MIP survey. The import variable is taken from 
OECD data and reflects industry imports at the two-digit NACE level. East is a dummy vari-
able, which indicates that the firm is situated in the eastern part of Germany (the former 
GDR). Finally, we add industry and time dummies as other specific circumstances in an in-
dustry and/or cyclical factors, which perhaps are not reflected by our other variables, but may 
affect the returns. 
3 Estimation Results 
In order to test the appropriateness of standard concentration indices and firm’s assessment of 
the competitive setting on profitability, we estimate an ordered probit for return on sales 
which is measured categorically as described in Table 1. As usual in the context of discrete 
choice, the model is based on a latent variable y* (here: profitability) being explained in a 
linear manner by 'x β . Since the latent variable is unobserved we rely on its surveyed cate-
gorical values. The econometric model can be written as: 
 
* '
*
i 0
*
0 i 1
*
i 5
 with 1,...,
0 if y
1 if <y
6 if y
i i iy x i
y
β ε
μ
μ μ
μ
= + =
⎧ ≤⎪ ≤⎪= ⎨⎪⎪ >⎩
?
N
 
As opposed to the usual ordered probit case, the cut-off points kμ  are known (see Table 1). 
Thus, there is no need to estimate the thresholds. Furthermore, by using the true threshold 
values we are able to identify the variance and interpret the estimated coefficients as in a lin-
ear regression model, i.e. as marginal effects of the latent model (see Czarnitzki and Kraft 
(2004a,b) and Verbeek (2000) p. 192-195 for an example). 
Since heteroscedasticity will lead to inconsistent estimates we account for groupwise multi-
plicative heteroscedasticity of the form i iexp(z )σ = σ α  where z is a vector of variables sus-
pected to cause heteroscedasticity. If heteroscedasticity is an issue in the ordered probit, α are 
additional coefficients to be estimated. In order to test if heteroscedasticity is an issue in our 
estimation, we perform LR tests. Heteroscedasticity is modelled by industry and time dum-
mies, by the east dummy and by firm size dummies. The LR tests show that that assumption 
of homoscedasticity has to be rejected. Thus, we interpret the heteroscedastic version of the 
models. 
According to Table 3, neither of the aggregate industry-based concentration indices is signifi-
cant. Hence, the results presented in Table 3 support Schmalensee’s conclusion: the impact of 
concentration is statistically weak, the coefficients have unstable signs, and lose significance, 
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if the specification is altered. On the basis of these results we could reject the hypothesis that 
there is a relation between market structure and profitability.   
The conclusion concerning the effect of imperfect competition is, however, totally reversed if 
the variables are considered which have been computed using the questionnaire information 
(Table 4 displays the results for the industry- and questionnaire-based variables). The number 
of competitors has a strong negative impact on profits as predicted by theory. In addition, if 
the competitors are larger, profits of a firm are significantly smaller. Intensive price competi-
tion also reduces profits. Hence, all competition variables generated on the basis of the survey 
work excellently. In contrast, the variables based on the official industry classification are 
now all insignificant – except for the case where all conventional concentration indices are 
included; then C6 concentration is significant but still negative – and clearly dominated by the 
survey-based variables. We interpret these results as evidence that the official industry classi-
fication does not reflect the relevant markets well. If information on the relevant market is 
available – as perceived by the firms – the expected relation clearly emerges. Hence, the qual-
ity of the industry classification and concentration variables calculated on the basis of this 
information is questionable, as measure for firms’ product markets.   
Furthermore, firms’ profitability is strengthened if barriers to entry exist, represented by other 
proxy variables. We measure barriers to entry by firms’ capital intensity and find a positive 
effect on profitability. Moreover, the market potential is a crucial factor for firm profitability; 
demand growth has a significant positive effect on return on sales. Profitability decreases with 
firm size, which is in accordance with earlier results (Neumann, Böbel and Haid 1979, 1981). 
Finally, exports generate higher return on sales. Finally, we do not find any evidence that 
buyer power affects firm profitability. 
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Table 3: Results for conventional concentration indices (homo- and heteroscedastic ordered probits with known thresholds) 
 Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) 
Herfindahla 0.167 0.164 0.067 0.047     
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.043) (0.043)     
C3 concontrationa 0.071 0.059   0.006 0.001   
 (0.086) (0.085)   (0.012) (0.012)   
C6 concentrationa -0.091* -0.086     -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.055) (0.053)     (0.010) (0.010) 
demand growtha 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.038** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
market share 0.106 0.126 0.049 0.066 0.059 0.078 0.070 0.090 
 (0.090) (0.085) (0.088) (0.083) (0.089) (0.084) (0.090) (0.084) 
import -0.005 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
export 0.018*** 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
log(employees) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
capital intensity 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
east -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
constant 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
industry dummies included included included included included included included included 
time dummies included included included included included included included included 
sigma 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
log likelihood -5708.74 -5681.56 -5714.43 -5687.34 -5715.96 -5688.23 -5716.08 -5688.04 
joint sign.b 91.85*** 98.35*** 86.26*** 92.08*** 83.90*** 90.22*** 83.10*** 90.03*** 
LR-test(het.) c  54.34***  54.18***  55.46***  56.08*** 
joint sig.(het.) d  26.87**  26.68**  27.38**  27.70** 
number of obs. 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate significance at 1 % (5 % , 10 %) level, a Lagged variables, b test of joint significance of all variables, c LR-test of heteroscedasticity, d test of significance of variables determining heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4: Results for firms'assessment of competitive situation (homo- and heteroscedastic ordered probits with known thresholds) 
 Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Herfindahla 0.126 0.127 0.048 0.028       
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.042) (0.041)       
C3 concontrationa 0.078 0.061   0.002 -0.003     
 (0.086) (0.084)   (0.013) (0.012)     
C6 concentrationa -0.091* -0.084     -0.005 -0.008   
 (0.054) (0.053)     (0.010) (0.010)   
intensive comp. -0.008** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
intermediate comp. -0.008** -0.007** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008*** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
comp. size -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
strong buyer power -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
quite strong buyer power 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
demand growtha 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
market share 0.121 0.134 0.068 0.078 0.078 0.090 0.089 0.103 0.080 0.086 
 (0.093) (0.087) (0.092) (0.085) (0.093) (0.086) (0.093) (0.086) (0.090) (0.083) 
strong price comp. -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
import -0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
export 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(employees) -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
capital intensity 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
east -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
constant 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
industry dummies included included included included included included included included included included 
time dummies included included included included included included included included included included 
sigma 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
log likelihood -5672.08 -5642.28 -5677.15 -5647.49 -5677.10 -5647.76 -5677.86 -5647.31 -5678.02 -5647.81 
joint sign.b 129.39*** 140.40*** 123.426*** 133.24*** 121.60*** 132.18*** 121.21*** 132.58*** 121.13*** 132.11*** 
LR-test(het.) c  59.59***  59.32***  60.48***  61.10***  60.42*** 
joint sig.(het.) d  29.04***  28.62***  29.23***  29.56***  29.24*** 
number of obs. 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 
Notes: a Lagged variables, b test of joint significance of all variables, c LR-test of heteroscedasticity, d test of significance of variables determining heteroscedasticity. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper reports the results of a study which employs rarely available variables. We com-
pare the performance of variables which are computed using the official industry classifica-
tion with the effect of variables generated on the basis of information gathered from the firms 
themselves. The industry-based variables are concentration indices and the market share. The 
variables based on the survey information are the number of competitors, the size of the com-
petitors, the relevance of price competition and the number of customers.   
Our own data clearly outperforms the industry-based variables. While our competition vari-
ables have a strong impact on profitability, no relation is found for the industry-based vari-
ables. We think that it is not appropriate to use the officially determined three digit industry as 
the relevant market. The information is too noisy, with the result that no significant relation 
can be estimated. However, the use of information supplied by the firms themselves can be 
very useful in explaining profit levels.  
While the result with respect to the use of industry data is rather negative, it is quite suppor-
tive of theoretical predictions. Profits fall if competitive pressure increases.   
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